Polarizing Polarizer Cpl

Polarizing Polarizer Cpl

A comprehensive approach to combat identification Wojack Adam Maj and Maj Eduardo Ospital

Combat Identification (CID) is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects (friendly, enemy or neutral) across the joint battlefield to the extent that, with great confidence, the timely application of military options and weapons resources can occur. Combat identification is achieved by the application domain of a family of knowledge of the situation and target identification capabilities, and adherence to the doctrine, tactics unit, techniques and procedures (TTP), and adopted rules of engagement (ROE) that directly support a combatant to shoot / no shoot decisions of the detected objects in its field. The objective of CID is to improve combat unit effectiveness while avoiding fratricide and minimize collateral damage. CID is the process that handles passing humans or sensors to identify the entities in the field of battle before rolling / no decisions do not shoot. To carry out CID, the fighter uses all available means at your disposal to sort the entities in the field battle before applying combat power or fire effects. The key point is to allow the fighter to maximize the effects of lethal fires against the enemy, while at the same time, reduce or eliminate the effects of fire on the friendly or neutral staff, equipment and facilities. While DIC is a complex series of connected systems, procedures and doctrine, where it is effective, simple and transparent. When it is ineffective, its results can be tragic and disastrous. A recent example of the "links" CID chain (family of systems ["View" of the institution] + Training ["identify" the entity] + Doctrine / TTP / ROE ["Engage" the Entity]) breaks in the Global War on Terrorism is the highly publicized incident Pat Tillman.

Fratricide in Afghanistan

While on patrol in a sector of the Taliban-infested Afghanistan Patktia province, an element of the 2nd Battalion, 75 Ranger Regiment, were stalled because of a fracture HMMWV. The segment of the bunch with Corporal Pat Tillman, series 1, passes through a canyon and was near its northern edge. The other segment, series 2, changed plans travel due to bad road conditions impeding the recovery of a broken HMMWV towed by a vehicle being purchased locally. Series 2 entered the canyon same from the south. Series 2 does not have the ability to communicate their status and change map for series 1, due to the rugged terrain. Upon entering the canyon, series 2 was to fire mortars and small arms from the Afghan Taliban fighters. Rangers heard the initial blast series 1 that preceded the attack. CPL Tillman and two other leaders team received the order to fire the attackers head. Canyon walls prevented them from his group radio positions of their colleagues, as well as of wave 2 had not radio for its change of plans. CPL Tillman went to the north-south ridge to face the canyon. The light was dimming. "It was like the twilight," a Ranger in the fight recalled. "You could not see colors, but you could see silhouettes." Fellow Ranger felt the light was "still pretty good." A sergeant with Tillman on the ridge recalled that "you could see the enemy from the high ridge line north. I could see the flashes of gunfire." The suspected guerrillas Taliban were about half a mile away. Tillman took another Ranger and an Afghan ally down the slope "in a position where he could engage the enemy" the sergeant said. Close range watched Tillman take cover. "I remember not liking his position, I had seen a bright red marker over us … which immediately caught my attention as a marker M240 … at that moment the question of "friendly fire" began turning in my mind. "As series 2 pulled alongside the ridge, the gunners poured an undisciplined barrage of hundreds of rounds into the area Tillman and other members of the series 1 had taken position. The first to die was the Afghan, whom the Rangers in series 2 was mistaken for a Taliban fighter. Under fire, Tillman and almost a dozen people on the ridge " he shouted, waving his arms and cried some more. "Tillman then used a smoke grenade to mark his position and the firing ceased for a moment. The Rangers Series 1 thought that the commitment had ended and he rose from his position. The HMMWV then moved to a position of advantage and resumed firing, killing Tillman the commitment seconds. To use this example to explain more tragic CID, you must first understand the basic formula: Situational Awareness (SA) + Objective Identification (TI) = Combat identification (CID.)

Combat Identification: The process of achieving a characterization accurately detected objects (friendly, enemy, neutral) on the joint battlefield to the extent that, with great confidence, timely application of military options and weapons resources can occur (CID MA ICD). Combat ID is achieved through application domain of a family of knowledge of the status and capabilities target identification, and adherence to the doctrine, the unity of TTP, and approved ROE that directly supports a combatant "shoot / no shoot" decision of detected objects in its field.

Combat Effectiveness: (in conjunction with Combat ID) the ability of a friendly unit to rapidly and accurately classify and characterize the objects detected on the battlefield in order to allow timely application of combat power and fire effects against enemy force or target (destroy, neutralize, eliminate or interrupt), with the lowest risk of death, injury or damage to friendly forces and neutral institutions, facilities and equipment ((prevention of fratricide and collateral damage) the definition by the MTC PBC / CID).

Situational Awareness (SA): SA is reported temperature (blue), the enemy (red), neutral and unknown entities typically displayed on a computer or manually on a map published. For the purposes of CID, SA only describe what it refers to the automated information systems were reported C2/SA available. There are three key attributes of the SA – the accuracy and timely reports; density of the position of blue, the location information (PLI) generation systems, and interoperability of systems C2/SA friendly force in the field concerned. SA sent to and displayed in two places at the common image of Operations (COP) located in Command Posts for C2 purposes, and for each vehicle / aircraft / platform soldier C2/SA display devices for both C2 and Combat identification purposes. The latter directly supports shooting / No shoot decisions by human shooters and sensors in the vicinity of enemy forces on the battlefield.

When the unit lost CPL Tillman SA that their subordinate elements were in relation to each other, the situation deteriorated: two converging friendly forces to each other without communication. Several systems could have prevented this loss of SA in the element of Tillman Ranger. A FBCB2 / Blue Force Tracker (GPS-fed, vehicle-mounted or hand held system C2/SA) would have the capacity of all the components of a visual representation of where to mount and dismount were friendly forces, assuming, of course, that all vehicles and dismounted elements involved were well equipped. Knowing that the entities were blue in the battlefield in combination with the right mix of identification systems for vehicle targets that allowed the commander to plan its element crew served weapons gunners enemy targets, and to avoid engaging friendly forces.

Target Identification (TI): TI is the process of establishment of parentage (Blue, red, neutral) of the detected objects at the point of engagement in a battlefield immediately. This usually took place within the line of sight range visual and is for purposes of the application or the power of fire fighting enemies entities purposes or objectives, while preventing fratricide and minimize damage side. There are two categories of IT – the cooperative target identification (STI) and non-cooperative target identification (NCTI). CTI includes any method or material solution that allows a human shooter / sensor to "examine or question" a potential target, and allows the same potential target for "answer or answer "the interrogator in a timely manner. Air to Air and ground to air systems using IFF (identification friend or foe) Mode 4, and the field systems of low in the near future, you can use ID Battlefield Target Device (BTID) and Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI) CTI systems. Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) is a misnomer because none of the CTI technology to identify Foe, identified only friend or unknown (UFI) entities. NCTI involves methods or systems that leverage the physical characteristics of the entities in the battlefield to help with identification and affiliation, and does not require a cooperative response or response from the target. NCTI include optical systems (Forward Looking Infrared [FLIR], NVGs and binoculars), vehicle and personal brands (combat common identification marking systems [JCIMS], which include panels to Combat ID [PIC], thermal panels ID [Tips], Phoenix Beacons [infrared light lights] and Dismounted Combat Identification System [DCIMS-(TIP panel is mounted on a Kevlar helmet, giving an image of reversed polarity through FLIR device), and automatic target recognition (ATR) devices. JCIMS marking systems are used in combination with FLIR and optical vision goggles night and help in easy identification at the point of commitment.

In this example, number 2 (or platoon for that matter) did not have the proper perspective. thermal sights for HMMWV-mounted crew served weapons (or improved AN/PAS-13s Night Vision Goggles (ENVG), for example), combined with reverse polarity markings and / or thermal ballistic helmet covers all soldiers would have allowed the turret gunners to identify the Rangers walk in series 1 as friendly entities. TTP technology combined with tried to avoid fratricide and adherence to ROE could have prevented this from happening. Each link in the chain of CID was broken. Tillman group would have benefited from NCTI other devices such as infrared (IR) beacons for limited visibility operations (seen through of AN/PVS-7B/D or PVS-14 night vision goggles that every soldier that is currently issued) or a day-visible strobe light. CTI technology services to low domains of land (one platform to another "," platform for a soldier "," soldier to soldier, "" soldier on the platform) would have an additional tool at the point of compromise that would have allowed both periodicals to identify unknowns as friends. Unfortunately, technology CTI Direct fire [Battlefield target device identification BTID)] currently being recommended for an acquisition strategy for the U.S. Army USMC service and a domain-only "one platform to another", and interrogating the only targets of M1, M2/M3, and Stryker vehicles.

In the example Tillman, even if the HMMWVs are replaced by armored vehicles equipped with BTID, fratricide still could have produced yet after BTID not work within the "platform" soldier domain. This weakness in the CID "link" does not allow the shooter to obtain an identification positive (PID) got out of the unknown entity. In the example, series 2, in turn broke both the second ("ID" links) and third ("T Shoot / Don 'Shoot"): ROE was not satisfied with the gunners manning the crew served weapons in HMMWVs and positive identification (PID) it was acquired by the fire element. In addition, a TTP (ie smoke grenade, a sign), has not been established or trained before participation (or not included recruitment) as a signal to cease fire situations where "friendly fire." The platform number 2 shots could have used other procedures to avoid fratricide: the transmission of the location of the unknown entity to another element (eg, increased seat) for PID, by maneuvering to a position the advantage to the PID could be acquired, or by proposing Dide (detect, identify, decide, engage, and assess) Objective Participation Process (which are discussed later in this article.)

In this highly publicized incident, well-trained Rangers were placed in a situation that was not CID family appropriate and in the heat capacity of not properly implementing their training procedures and ROE. The end result was a difficult decision that led a fatal incident fratricide.

  Best CID capabilities of a technology's ability to service CTI multiple domains has gained importance since Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Fratricide Studies have shown an increase of 25% in "platform for soldier incidents and an increase in "soldier to soldier" incidents by 10% during the last major combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF.) The two technologies CTI recently approved for the acquisition strategy do not address this gap, or CID. EDTIB only services platform "to the platform" domain (M1, M2/M3, Stryker, and LRAS3) where as Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI) refers to the earth ground and air to ground domains a hint Close Air Support and perspective. None of these technologies directly from the platform of a soldier "and" soldier to soldier "domains. Independently what CTI technology is used, the fighter has yet to make the final determination whether to enter the unknown entity, based on blue, red or neutral. Once determined, the fighter must incorporate the roster criteria and constraints in its "shoot / no shoot" decision. Positive identification visual (PID) of the entity to determine if it is a legitimate military target, requiring consideration. There is no technology that identifies friend or foe (IFF). technologies CTI only identify friend or a stranger (IDU). CTI technology should not be used as the sole criterion for engagement due to its mechanical / nature electronic or enemy action (electronic countermeasures [ECM]) that could affect the operation of CTI technology. In addition, partial fielding (and either through design or system failure) CTI technology has been proven to increase fratricide, not decreases, as the teams are based on technology as the only criteria to participate or not participate an unknown entity.

  A comprehensive orientation process Within the Doctrine / TTP / ROE ("Shoot / Do not Shoot") coupling of CID is the proposed selection process known as detect, identify, decide, Hold, and evaluate (Dide). A review of current doctrine indicates that several processes are involved associated with targeting. Defense Department Joint Publication 3-60 identifies a six step orientation process: "To detect, locate, identify, decide, Strike, and evaluate." U.S. Army FM 3-09.12 describes a generic four-step targeting process: "To detect, decide, deliver and evaluate." A multi-Service TTP for time sensitive guidance called find, fix, track, Target, Engage, Assess was developed to support the prosecution of whites in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As was discovered in the 2004 Army and Marine Corps ground to ground Board (AMCB GG) study, the problem with Each of these processes is that the CID and the ROE application involve tasks embedded in one of the steps of performance. The "shoot / no shoot" The decision of incorporating ROE is not formally taught in professional military education courses-leading to another rest in the "links" in the chain DIC. As an overarching target engagement process, provide an iterative Dide, standardized and systematic approach to supporting the implementation of a CID and performance measures lethal ROE guidance for the full spectrum of users (from each soldier through indirect fire controllers and beyond). Dide enough generic to be used as a systematic process for planning target node C2 and decision making. This process incorporated into the doctrine that as a reference for professional military education. Individual actions Dide process are summarized below.

Detect – on the acquisition and location of an object on the battlefield. This first step in the target engagement process may involve the use of visual, radar, electronic signals measurement, or other means to detect and locate objects on the battlefield. Identify – a systematic process supporting the characterization of detected objects as friend, foe or neutral. This is the first step when specifying CID tasks are performed. Begins after an object is detected and located and offers a systematic process in which the attributes of a detected objects are systematically processed to support a friend, enemy, neutral determination. Decide – determination of the application appropriate military options and weapons resources on objects identified. This is the generic step in the process and is the first step when specifying ROE application takes place. specific sub-steps within the Decide phase varies depending on the weapon system / platform and mission applications. (Bursting indirect fire radio / CAS delivered ammunition and surface of the earth platform danger zones must be taken into account in this step due to the proximity of friendly or neutral entities). In some cases it may be the decision to use military options other than weapons systems (ie, the replacement of ISR assets to strengthen control of identified objects, etc.) In cases where an application to be considered weapons of resources, this phase are directed mainly to the following questions: 1) I can enter (application ROE)? 2) If several destinations, which for first part (The seriousness of the threat, the commander's intent / high payoff targets, high-value targets.)? 3) What is the best weapon system to work with (lethal / non-lethal, the effect of ammunition, collateral damage assessment)? Engage – specific application of military options and weapons resources. In this step the mechanical process of carrying out the decision in step takes place earlier. Evaluate – weapons are resources used to achieve the desired effect. In this step evaluates the effects of participation phase (evaluation battle damage) against the desired results. If the desired result was not achieved, the decision to re-engage the target could be done.

Dide serve as an objective requirement of the assignment process and support the insertion of certain tasks CID and ROE in the levels of training services and instructional programs. The individual platforms and mission-specific sub-sets would in a process that Dide account of the processes and mission-specific applications that platform.vi]

  A comprehensive solution CID Progress has been made since the Tillman incident. On the recommendation GG AMCB Study of CID, training, Doctrine and Combat Development Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky, assisted by the Administrator of the TRADOC Capability Platform Battle Command / Combat identification (TCM PBC / CID) and TRADOC centers, selected a provider in March 2006 to address issues related to incorporation of DIC in Army doctrine. CID comprehensive doctrine will be developed for inclusion in U.S. Army 3.90 FM, Tactics (publication date: July 4, 2001) that explains how to increase combat effectiveness in the fight against identification requirements, including but not limited to, SA IT TTP and ROE. CID's entry will go to the ground to ground ("one platform to another," "Soldier's platform," "soldier to soldier" "Welded to the platform"), air-land (helicopter platform to the unmanned aerial vehicle soldier to soldier), and land areas air mission.

Artillery doctrine has been updated to reflect the requirements of Combat Identification, including but not limited to, the insertion friend and ally / coalition objectives and neutral, and development of participatory processes direct fire artillery manuals existing destination Armor / Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Air. Defense and Aviation will be reviewed to identify deficiencies in the treatment of related tasks with the CID. This doctrine is for the entire Brigade Combat Team Heavy (HBCT), including armor, infantry, artillery, mortars, engineers and CASCOM and must be used as a template for the Combat Infantry Brigade (IBCT) and Brigade Combat Team Stryker (SBCT) manuals. The effort will take approximately 12 months doctrinal to complete the following beginning in March 2006. This initiative will strengthen the Doctrine / TTP / ROE ("Engage or not committing a") "Link" chain SA + IT.

Improvements in the current family of systems (FBCB2/JBC-P, Optics, 2 / 3 GENFLIR, JCIMS) that allows the "sensor-to-shooter kill the string "to see better targeting entity may be enhanced by the acquisition of CTI's services all the domains of land and land covered the air-ground mission area, as RBCI. CTI Future systems that fall in an acquisition strategy must be repaired as many domains as possible to fully address our CID empty.

Fratricide incidents are still occurring during stability operations in Iraq and are being committed by the platforms that do not are shielded. A system like BTID not have a positive impact in these incidents. Acquisition of CTI technology that services of all domains will strengthen the family systems ("Viewing the body") link in the equation of CID. Until that happens and the gap between the central doctrine of mitigation measures are in place (identified and financed by the study AMCB GG), fratricidal full spectrum operations is likely to continue happening.

The fog of war and the human factor makes the elimination total of fratricide impossible. Aim and "muscle memory" (the exercise capacity of crew and battle drills under conditions of stress, ie commands fire, fire control systems switch manipulation) training remains a "must" to keep the lethal equipment and soldiers, and is necessary to protect the same time the force from fratricide. The current operating environment driving the need for a skill-set target discrimination for all soldiers, trained in the context of Dide shoot / no shoot orientation process. This level of training based on sound doctrinal tune Fighter Case is at the point of commitment. Family doctrinal system and improvements, along with devices to improve the training (simulated combat vehicle recognition (ROC-V) and ranges targetry realistic blue, red and neutral incorporating shoot / no shoot decisions) will allow the soldier to make better decisions on whether or not to an unknown entity. The fighter must be able to ask themselves the question if you are unsure whether to shoot or not: (1) It's me or my friends in mortal danger? (2) What is the worst that can happen if you pull the trigger? (3) I am positive that my target is hostile?

There is no "silver bullet" The solution to stop all incidents of fratricide. The emphasis should be placed on improving the density of IT systems, SA, and in the Army inventory, preparation of the combatants of full spectrum operations and the acquisition of CTI technology in the service of all domains in the ground to the mission area on the ground. This can only be achieved by looking through a lens CID integral and strengthening each link in the CID (SA + IT [+ Family + Systems Training Doctrine / PTT /] ROE) of the chain. It is imperative that we do everything possible to avoid unfortunate incidents like the Tillman fratricide occurs in the future.

About the Author

Major Edward Ospital is the Combat Identification Branch Chief for the TRADOC Capability Manager Platform Battle Command / Combat Identification (TCM PBC/CID) at Ft. Knox, KY. He is a 1989 Distinguished Military Graduate from the California State University Sacramento ROTC program and holds a MBA. He is a graduate of Armor OBC, Armor Career Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, 2ID Sniper School, Scout Leader’s Course, and the Acquisition Basic Course. Major Ospital has served in various civilian law enforcement and Armor/Cavalry command and staff positions in the continental United States, Korea, and Germany.

CPT Adam N. Wojack is the S3 Plans Officer for the 2nd “Dagger” Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division at Camp Liberty, Iraq. He was a Distinguished Military Graduate from U.S. Army Officer Candidate School in 1997, and commanded Alpha Company, 1-26 Infantry in Schweinfurt, Germany. He has a B.A. in English from Baruch College in New York City and has served in various leadership and staff positions in Iraq, Kosovo, Germany, Hawaii, Fort Campbell, Panama and Korea.